All Along the Watchtower

## A Long Conversation with ChatGPT

can you please explain how the recorded merkle root system (ie recording Merkle roots progressively onto
a Blockchain
after Slabs of 24 Blocks of 1024 transaction traces have been cross-checked by ChubbyChecker) is made to work to ensure no corruption
is present on the checked databases – in particular with what do we compare these Merkle roots at the time the next Merkle root is recorded?

ChatGPT said:
ChatGPT

The progressive recording of Merkle roots onto the Elastos Blockchain serves as a cryptographic method for ensuring the integrity of the
database’s transaction traces. Here’s how the system works and how Merkle roots are used to ensure there is no corruption:
1. Merkle Root Overview

A Merkle root is a single cryptographic hash derived from a hierarchical structure of hashes (Merkle tree) representing a set of data
(in this case, 1024 transaction traces per block, and 24 blocks per slab).
Each transaction trace is hashed, and these hashes are recursively combined to form a tree structure, with the root hash at the top.

2. Progressive Recording to Elastos Blockchain

After processing and cross-checking a slab (24 blocks, 1024 transactions each), the final Merkle root for that slab is calculated.
This Merkle root is recorded on the Elastos Blockchain as a cryptographically verifiable record of the slab’s state.

3. Ensuring Integrity at the Time of Next Merkle Root

When the next slab is processed and its Merkle root is calculated:

The system retrieves the previous Merkle root from the blockchain.
The new Merkle root incorporates the previous root in its calculation (e.g., by hashing the new root with the previous root).
This chaining mechanism ensures continuity and integrity between slabs.

4. Verification Process

To ensure no corruption has occurred:

Replay Verification:
The system can reprocess all transaction traces from the beginning (or from a specific checkpoint) to recompute the Merkle roots for each slab.
The recomputed roots are compared with those stored on the blockchain. Any mismatch would indicate potential corruption or inconsistency.
Incremental Verification:
For the next slab, the Merkle tree is constructed, and its root is compared against the hash derived by combining the current slab root with the
previous blockchain-stored root.
This ensures the integrity of the current slab and its linkage to the past data.

5. Cross-Domain Consensus

If the system operates across multiple databases:

Each participating database independently computes and submits Merkle roots to ChubbyChecker for cross-verification.
The consensus Merkle root is then generated by aggregating these roots. If any database’s root differs, this indicates a discrepancy.

6. Mitigating Corruption

If corruption is detected during the comparison of Merkle roots:
The system can trace the discrepancy to the specific block or transaction trace causing the mismatch.
Rollback or reconciliation mechanisms can be applied, using the blockchain as a trusted source of previous valid states.

Summary

The Merkle root comparison relies on:

Chaining Merkle roots across slabs for continuity.
Storing roots on the immutable Elastos Blockchain for tamper-proof verification.
Recomputing and comparing roots as needed to detect discrepancies.

This setup ensures that if any corruption occurs in the checked databases, it will manifest as a mismatch during the
Merkle root verification process, allowing for timely detection and corrective action.

Editor:
so i am quite surprised that you seemed to be indicating that the Merkle Root recording system can not only detect discrepancies bu also
(am i correct here? .. ) specify where the discrepancy originates – if so can you explain how this is possible?

ChatGPT said:
ChatGPT

Yes, a well-designed Merkle root recording system can detect discrepancies and help pinpoint their origin. This is possible due to the hierarchical
structure of the Merkle tree and the way it encodes the transaction traces. Here’s how it works:
1. Structure of a Merkle Tree

A Merkle tree is a binary tree where:
Leaf nodes represent hashes of individual transaction traces.
Intermediate nodes represent hashes of their child nodes.
The Merkle root is a single hash at the top of the tree, representing the entire dataset.

For a slab of 24 blocks × 1024 transactions, the tree is built as follows:

Hash each transaction trace.
Pair hashes together and hash the pairs.
Continue pairing and hashing until a single root hash is obtained.

2. Detecting Discrepancies

When a new Merkle root is computed for the next slab, the system compares it to:

The expected root stored on the blockchain (if replaying historical data).
The incremental root chained with the prior root (if checking continuity).

If a mismatch is found, the discrepancy is detected, but we need to locate the issue. Here’s how the tree helps:
3. Locating the Discrepancy

The system verifies the Merkle tree level by level, starting from the root:
If the Merkle root does not match the expected root, this indicates that at least one transaction trace (or its hash) in the slab is incorrect.
Proceed down the tree:
Compare hashes at the next level down.
If a mismatch is found at this level, the problem is confined to one of the two child nodes.
Continue descending the tree until reaching a leaf node. The leaf node corresponds to a specific transaction trace.

For example:

A mismatch at the second level of the tree would narrow the problem to a specific block of 1024 transactions.
Further checks narrow it to an individual transaction within that block.

4. Why This Works

The Merkle tree’s structure ensures that any change to the data propagates upward, altering every hash along the path to the root:

If a single transaction trace changes, its hash changes.
This change affects all parent nodes up to the root.
By traversing the tree, the system can trace the path back to the altered transaction.

5. Practical Application

When discrepancies are found:
The system reprocesses transaction traces to isolate the problematic one.
It checks this transaction against other systems or historical data for correction.
This process can even differentiate between genuine corruption and deliberate tampering.

6. What Happens Next

Once the problematic transaction or block is identified:

If the issue is tampering or corruption, the system can trigger alerts and reconciliation processes.
If the issue is due to a sync failure or processing error, the system can resynchronize or recompute the affected data.

Summary

The ability to pinpoint discrepancies arises from the hierarchical structure of the Merkle tree, where each level builds on the hashes below it.
By following mismatches down the tree, the system isolates errors to specific transactions or blocks. This precision is a key advantage of using
Merkle trees in systems requiring high integrity and traceability, like your ChubbyChecker-Hedera Blockchain integration.

Editor:
but does this not mean that we must preserve all transaction traces and not just the Merkle roots?

ChatGPT said:
ChatGPT

You’re absolutely correct: to pinpoint discrepancies using Merkle trees, the transaction traces themselves (or at least the intermediate hashes
in the tree) must be preserved, not just the Merkle roots. Here’s why and how this can be managed efficiently:
1. Why Transaction Traces or Intermediate Hashes Must Be Preserved

The Merkle root alone is a summary of the data—it proves the integrity of the data but does not contain the information necessary to isolate
discrepancies.
If a discrepancy is detected between the current Merkle root and the expected Merkle root, the system needs access to:
The original transaction traces or
The intermediate hashes in the Merkle tree to traverse the tree and identify where the mismatch originates.

Without this data, the system cannot reconstruct the tree or locate the error.
2. Strategies for Managing and Preserving Data

To address the need for storage while balancing practicality, there are several strategies:
Option A: Preserve All Transaction Traces

Retain all transaction traces in a dedicated database or storage system.
Use the transaction traces to rebuild the Merkle tree if discrepancies arise.
This approach ensures full traceability but requires significant storage capacity.

Option B: Preserve Intermediate Merkle Tree Hashes

Instead of preserving all transaction traces, retain the intermediate hashes for each level of the Merkle tree.
This reduces storage requirements while still allowing pinpointing of discrepancies.
Trade-off: You cannot fully reconstruct the original transaction trace without external data, but you can still verify integrity.

Option C: Archive Older Traces

Retain recent transaction traces and intermediate hashes for fast verification.
Archive older traces (e.g., in cold storage or cloud services) to reduce the active storage burden.
Use blockchain-anchored Merkle roots to ensure archived data can still be verified when retrieved.

Option D: Distributed Ledger

Use a distributed ledger system (like Elastos or another blockchain) to store summaries or critical portions of transaction traces,
reducing reliance on centralized storage.

3. Efficient Data Management

To implement this in your system:

ChubbyChecker Role: ChubbyChecker can store and manage intermediate hashes locally on each participating node. These hashes can be periodically
consolidated.
Blockchain Role: Elastos Blockchain stores the Merkle roots, ensuring global visibility and immutability.
Storage Layers:
Primary storage for recent transaction traces or intermediate hashes.
Secondary (or archival) storage for older data.

4. Benefits of Retaining Transaction Data

Discrepancy Isolation: Enables tracing discrepancies to specific transactions.
Auditing: Facilitates detailed audits for regulatory or security purposes.
Forensic Analysis: Allows identification of tampering or system errors post-factum.

5. Trade-offs

While preserving transaction traces or intermediate hashes is ideal for full traceability, it comes with:

Storage Costs: Large datasets require efficient storage strategies.
Performance Impact: Retaining and accessing data can impact system performance unless optimized.

Conclusion

Yes, to leverage the full power of Merkle trees for both integrity checking and discrepancy pinpointing, you must preserve either:

All transaction traces (for full reconstructive ability), or
Intermediate hashes of the Merkle tree (for pinpointing discrepancies).

The choice depends on your system’s storage and performance constraints, but retaining some form of the data beyond Merkle roots
is essential for traceability.

Editor:
can you rundown the benefits and disadvantages of storing (and later archiving) all transaction traces versus storing (and later archiving) intermediate hashes?

ChatGPT said:
ChatGPT
Comparison of Storing All Transaction Traces vs. Storing Intermediate Hashes

Below is a detailed analysis of the benefits and disadvantages of each approach.
1. Storing All Transaction Traces
Benefits

Full Reconstruction of Merkle Tree:
All data required to reconstruct the Merkle tree is preserved.
Enables comprehensive forensic analysis, including reconstructing transaction details and root hashes for verification.

Discrepancy Isolation:
Can pinpoint discrepancies down to the exact transaction(s) that caused the mismatch in the Merkle tree.
Facilitates debugging and tamper detection.

Audit and Reporting:
Provides a complete historical record of transactions for regulatory compliance, reporting, or audits.
Essential for industries with stringent data integrity or traceability requirements.

Flexibility:
Allows verification under different hashing algorithms if necessary in the future.
Useful for re-checking integrity if Merkle tree construction algorithms or logic evolve.

Disadvantages

High Storage Requirements:
Storing all transaction traces requires significantly more storage than intermediate hashes, especially with high transaction volumes.
May lead to scalability issues over time without sufficient infrastructure.

Data Security Risk:
Large datasets are a higher-value target for attackers, requiring robust encryption, access control, and backup mechanisms.

Performance Impact:
Searching through and processing a large number of traces can slow down operations.
Requires indexing and optimization for queries.

Archival Complexity:
Moving older data to archive storage can be complex and require careful indexing and metadata management to maintain usability.

2. Storing Intermediate Hashes Only
Benefits

Reduced Storage Requirements:
Intermediate hashes require significantly less storage, as only the hashed summaries of data are stored instead of full transactions.
More scalable for high transaction volumes or resource-constrained environments.

Sufficient for Discrepancy Isolation:
Allows pinpointing discrepancies to specific sub-trees or sets of transactions in the Merkle tree, reducing the need to scan the entire dataset.

Improved Performance:
Faster to compute and verify hashes than to process raw transaction traces.
Reduces the overhead for maintaining and querying large datasets.

Easier to Archive:
Compact size makes it easier to move and store hashes in long-term or off-site archival storage.

Disadvantages

Limited Forensic Capability:
Cannot reconstruct the original transaction data from intermediate hashes.
Makes full audits or deep forensics impossible unless transaction traces are stored elsewhere.

Dependence on Original Data:
If the original transaction traces are deleted or lost, it is impossible to verify or audit the data at a granular level.
Requires tight integration with systems storing transaction traces.

Reduced Flexibility:
Harder to adapt to new hashing algorithms or Merkle tree structures in the future since raw data is unavailable.

Verification Complexity:
While compact, intermediate hashes add complexity to verification, as discrepancies in one sub-tree still require
investigation across layers of the tree.

3. Combined Approach (Hybrid)

A hybrid strategy can balance the advantages of both approaches:

Recent Transactions: Store full transaction traces for recent data to enable comprehensive audits and quick verifications.
Older Transactions: Archive intermediate hashes for older data, reducing storage while retaining discrepancy detection capabilities.
Blockchain Anchoring: Periodically anchor Merkle roots on the Elastos Blockchain to maintain a secure, immutable reference.

Comparison Table
Aspect All Transaction Traces Intermediate Hashes
Storage High Low
Granular Discrepancy Isolation Yes Partial
Audit/Regulatory Compliance Fully Supported Limited
Performance Slower (due to large datasets) Faster
Forensic Capability Full Limited
Scalability Challenging for large datasets High
Adaptability High. Low
Archival Simplicity Moderate High

4. Final Recommendation

Industries Requiring Full Forensics: Store all transaction traces with careful planning for archival.
High-Volume/Cost-Sensitive Systems: Store intermediate hashes with blockchain anchoring for critical data.
Hybrid Use Case: Combine both approaches:
Recent data stored in full for active use.
Older data archived as intermediate hashes for storage efficiency.

Editor:
could you give me examples of industries requiring full forensic capacity

ChatGPT said:
ChatGPT

Industries that require full forensic capacity typically operate under strict regulatory, security, and operational demands. These industries must ensure the ability to reconstruct detailed transaction histories, detect anomalies,
and comply with auditing or legal mandates. Here are examples of such industries:
1. Financial Services

Examples: Banking, insurance, stock exchanges, payment gateways.
Reason:
Compliance with stringent regulations (e.g., Basel III, Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank).
Ability to audit and verify every transaction for fraud detection, anti-money laundering (AML), and counter-terrorism financing (CTF).
Dispute resolution and customer claims require full transaction records.

2. Healthcare

Examples: Hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, medical device manufacturers.
Reason:
Regulatory compliance with standards like HIPAA (USA) or GDPR (EU).
Need for forensic investigation into medical record changes, patient data breaches, or malpractice claims.
Traceability for drug development, clinical trials, and vaccine distribution.

3. Supply Chain and Logistics

Examples: Food safety, electronics manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, design of structural metals.
Reason:
Traceability requirements to monitor and verify the provenance and handling of goods.
Compliance with international standards like ISO 28000 or FSMA (Food Safety Modernization Act).
Ability to investigate product recalls or quality control failures.

4. Legal and Law Enforcement

Examples: Courts, police departments, digital forensics firms.
Reason:
Chain of custody for evidence in criminal investigations or litigation.
Need to demonstrate unaltered, complete records for admissibility in court.
Forensic analysis of cybercrime or digital fraud.

5. Energy and Utilities

Examples: Power grids, oil & gas companies, renewable energy providers.
Reason:
Real-time monitoring and forensic analysis of grid failures, outages, or malfunctions.
Auditing for compliance with environmental and safety regulations.
Historical records for infrastructure upgrades or fault analysis.

6. Aerospace and Defense

Examples: Military operations, satellite communications, aviation safety.
Reason:
Strict requirements for traceability and forensic analysis of equipment failures or security breaches.
Compliance with national and international defense regulations.
Investigation of incidents like aircraft crashes or cyber intrusions.

7. Government and Public Sector

Examples: Tax authorities, elections management, public health departments.
Reason:
Auditing financial records, election data integrity, or public program allocations.
Investigating misuse of funds or fraudulent activities.
Traceability of critical data to ensure transparency.

8. Blockchain and Cryptocurrency

Examples: Exchanges, decentralized finance (DeFi) platforms.
Reason:
Full transaction traceability for regulatory compliance and fraud detection.
Auditing to ensure trust and transparency in decentralized systems.
Forensics for investigating hacks, scams, or exploits.

9. Telecommunications

Examples: Mobile operators, internet service providers (ISPs).
Reason:
Investigating security breaches, network outages, or fraud cases.
Compliance with data retention laws for law enforcement purposes.
Monitoring and resolving disputes related to call/data usage.

10. Critical Infrastructure

Examples: Nuclear plants, water treatment facilities, transportation systems.
Reason:
Real-time forensic capability to address incidents of sabotage, cyberattacks, or equipment failures.
Compliance with safety and operational standards.
Historical analysis for risk assessment and prevention.

Key Attributes Across These Industries

Regulatory Requirements: Laws or standards mandate detailed record-keeping.
High Stakes: Errors or breaches can result in severe financial, reputational, or safety consequences.
Complex Systems: Need for detailed traceability to understand interactions within multi-layered systems.

Conclusion: Industries in the above categories need full forensic capacity because of their reliance
on immutable, verifiable data to maintain operational integrity, regulatory compliance, and public trust.

Editor:
so it appears we would require full forensic capability for example in our health app and because of the
life-critical nature of housing construction supply chains (witness the Grenfell Tower disaster)

ChatGPT said:
ChatGPT

You’re absolutely correct. Both healthcare and housing construction supply chains represent industries
where full forensic capability is critical, and the stakes are high. Let’s explore why this requirement applies specifically to your
health app and housing app:
1. Health App
Why Full Forensic Capability Is Needed:

Life-critical Decisions:
Healthcare decisions often rely on accurate and complete patient histories, lab results, and medical prescriptions. Any error or
tampering in this data could have fatal consequences.
Regulatory Compliance:
Laws like HIPAA (USA) or GDPR (EU) mandate stringent logging, traceability, and data integrity to ensure patient safety and privacy.
Incident Investigation:
Misdiagnoses, treatment errors, or potential hacking attempts must be traceable to their root causes for forensic analysis and
legal accountability.
Cybersecurity Threats:
Healthcare systems are prime targets for ransomware attacks. Forensic logging ensures you can track unauthorized access and data
manipulations.

Examples of Forensic Needs in Healthcare:

Investigating discrepancies in electronic health records (EHRs).
Tracing the history of a misinterpreted lab result.
Analyzing the access logs to determine if a patient’s data was breached.

2. Housing App (Construction Supply Chains)
Why Full Forensic Capability Is Needed:

Safety and Compliance:
Construction materials, designs, and processes must adhere to strict safety codes. Errors or corner-cutting in supply chains can
result in disasters, as seen in incidents like the Grenfell Tower fire.
Accountability:
If a structural failure occurs, forensic data can determine whether the issue arose from material defects, design flaws, or
construction mistakes.
Traceability of Materials:
Forensic logging can provide a transparent history of where materials originated, how they were transported, and whether they
met quality standards.
Fraud Prevention:
Supply chains are vulnerable to substitution with cheaper, substandard materials. Detailed traceability helps prevent such practices.

Examples of Forensic Needs in Housing Supply Chains:

Tracking the origin and quality certifications of fire-resistant cladding.
Verifying whether critical materials (e.g., load-bearing steel) were inspected and transported under proper conditions.
Identifying lapses in the communication chain that led to an error in construction.

Challenges of Not Having Full Forensic Capacity

Legal Repercussions:
Without forensic records, it would be difficult to defend against lawsuits or prove due diligence in compliance with safety standards.
Reputational Risk:
Lack of traceability can result in public mistrust, particularly after incidents like a health data breach or a construction failure.
Inability to Improve Systems:
Forensic capability isn’t just reactive—it also allows organizations to analyze past failures and improve processes.

How Forensic Capability Helps Across Domains
1. Ensuring Immutable Records:

By storing transaction traces or intermediate hashes using Merkle roots, you can detect tampering while maintaining an efficient audit trail.
2. Enabling Real-time Monitoring:

Anomalies can be detected and flagged immediately, potentially saving lives or preventing disasters.
3. Streamlined Dispute Resolution:

When disputes arise (e.g., between suppliers or healthcare providers), forensic logs provide an objective, verifiable record of events.
Conclusion

For your health app, forensic capability ensures patient safety, regulatory compliance, and system integrity. For the housing app, it ensures
the traceability and accountability critical to maintaining safe construction practices. Both require
immutable logs, real-time traceability, and the ability to reconstruct historical transactions to protect lives and ensure trust.

Editor:
in light of this, would storing transaction traces on etcd storage nodes be adequate and if not wouldn’t storing the trace information on another database just replicate the original problem of certifying the uncorrupted and untampered storage of data?

ChatGPT said:
ChatGPT

Storing transaction traces on etcd storage nodes can be an efficient way to manage distributed data with high availability, but for the purpose of ensuring forensic-grade integrity and tamper-proof storage, it is not adequate as a standalone solution.
Here’s why, and what alternative approaches can address these concerns:
Why etcd Alone Is Insufficient

Lack of Tamper-Proof Guarantees:
etcd is designed as a distributed key-value store for metadata and configuration rather than for storing large, immutable data sets.
While it ensures consistency, it doesn’t inherently provide tamper-proof guarantees.
An attacker who gains access to etcd nodes could alter stored traces or hashes.

Limited Forensic Transparency:
etcd’s internal logging and version history can help track changes, but it doesn’t provide cryptographic proofs (like Merkle trees)
that can independently verify data integrity.

Replication of Trust Issues:
If the original issue is ensuring that transaction traces are unaltered, moving the data to another database like etcd merely shifts
the trust problem to a new system. Without cryptographic assurances, this does not solve the underlying concern.

What You Need for Forensic-Grade Storage

To ensure that stored transaction traces are unaltered and tamper-proof, you need:

Cryptographic Anchoring:
Use Merkle tree structures to generate root hashes of the transaction traces and anchor those on an immutable ledger
(e.g., the Elastos Blockchain).
This allows you to verify that a stored trace or hash corresponds to an original untampered version.

Immutable Storage:
Use a WORM (Write Once, Read Many) storage solution, such as AWS S3 Glacier Vault Lock, Azure Blob Storage with Immutable Policies,
or immutable logging services. These solutions prevent modification of stored data after writing.

Replication with Validation:
Replicate transaction traces across multiple systems (etcd, PostGIS, or another database), but verify integrity using anchored Merkle roots.

Auditable Changes:
Implement strong auditing features with detailed logs of who accessed or attempted to modify the data.

Proposed Architecture
1. Store Transaction Traces in PostGIS (or another primary database)

Why PostGIS:
You already use PostGIS databases for your application.
It can handle large-scale data storage effectively.
Transaction traces can be linked to spatial or relational data in your system.

2. Use etcd for Metadata

Store pointers to transaction traces in etcd, along with hash values or metadata needed for quick access and validation.

3. Anchor Merkle Roots to Elastos Blockchain

After processing each slab of data (e.g., 1024 transactions), compute a Merkle root and anchor it to the blockchain.
This ensures tamper-proof verification of data integrity over time.

4. Validate on Read Operations

Whenever a transaction trace is read or used, its hash should be recomputed and compared against the Merkle root stored on the blockchain.

Challenges of Storing Transaction Traces on Another Database

Storing transaction traces in a secondary database (like etcd or a dedicated PostGIS instance) raises concerns of data duplication and trust replication:

Duplication:
Keeping multiple copies increases storage requirements and synchronization complexity.
Trust Replication:
Both databases must now be trusted. Without cryptographic guarantees, the trust issue persists across systems.

Conclusion

Storing transaction traces on etcd nodes alone is not sufficient. A robust forensic system requires a combination of immutable storage
(e.g., blockchain anchoring), cryptographic proofs, and distributed validation. PostGIS can serve as the primary storage for traces, complemented
by etcd for metadata and Elastos Blockchain for tamper-proof anchoring. This layered approach ensures integrity, scalability, and forensic readiness.

Editor:
this means i would have a double role for PostGIS ie 1. Primary enterprise application data 2. Possibly even more important transaction trace storage

ChatGPT said:
ChatGPT

Yes, assigning a double role to PostGIS—serving as both the primary enterprise application data store and the transaction trace storage—is a feasible
and strategic approach, given the following considerations:
Benefits of Using PostGIS for Both Roles
1. Centralized and Consistent Data Management

Unified schema management:
Maintaining both application data and transaction traces in a single database reduces administrative overhead and complexity.
Ease of cross-referencing:
Transaction traces often correspond to application data (e.g., orders, shipments, patients, or construction records). Storing both in the same
database simplifies querying and analysis.

2. Advanced Query Capabilities

PostGIS allows for sophisticated spatial and relational queries. Storing transaction traces alongside enterprise data enables:
Trace-to-data validation:
Easily query both transaction traces and the data they modify or create to validate system integrity.
Spatial trace tracking:
In systems with spatial elements (e.g., logistics or construction), track the geographic flow of transactions.

3. Built-In ACID Compliance

PostGIS inherits PostgreSQL’s ACID (Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation, Durability) properties, ensuring that transaction traces are securely
stored with the same guarantees as primary application data.

4. Scalability

PostgreSQL/PostGIS can scale horizontally and vertically, accommodating increasing data loads. Partitioning or sharding could separate
transaction trace storage from application data for better performance.

Challenges and How to Address Them
1. Increased Database Load

Problem: Storing both transaction traces and application data increases storage and query load.
Solution:
Use table partitioning:
Partition transaction traces by time (e.g., daily, monthly) to improve query performance.
Implement archival policies:
Move older transaction traces to a cheaper, long-term storage solution (e.g., AWS S3 Glacier) while keeping recent traces
readily accessible.
Optimize indexing:
Index critical columns (e.g., timestamps, transaction IDs, Merkle roots) for faster lookups.

2. Risk of Coupling

Problem: A failure in the PostGIS database could disrupt both application functionality and trace validation.
Solution:
Implement database clustering:
Use a replicated setup (e.g., using BDR or pgpool-II) to ensure high availability.
Separate physical storage:
Even within the same database, use separate physical disks or tablespaces for transaction traces and enterprise
data to mitigate I/O contention.

3. Data Integrity and Forensic Proof

Problem: Combining data roles could make it harder to certify the integrity of transaction traces if PostGIS itself is compromised.
Solution:
Anchor Merkle roots:
Regularly compute Merkle roots for transaction trace slabs and anchor them to the Elastos Blockchain. This ensures tamper-proof
verification independent of PostGIS.
Immutable backups:
Use WORM storage for immutable backups of transaction traces to prevent unauthorized modification.

4. Storage Volume

Problem: Transaction traces can quickly grow to massive sizes, especially in high-transaction systems.
Solution:
Use data compression:
PostgreSQL supports columnar storage and compression extensions like pg_compress or TimescaleDB.
Archive older traces:
Use external archival storage for long-term retention of older transaction traces.

Alternative Architectures

If the dual role of PostGIS introduces excessive complexity or risks, consider the following alternatives:
1. Dedicated PostGIS Instances

Use two separate PostGIS instances:
Instance 1: Application data.
Instance 2: Transaction traces.
Advantages:
Physical and logical separation reduces risk and contention.
Trade-offs:
Higher operational complexity (e.g., separate backups, monitoring).

2. Use of a Separate Trace-Specific Database

Store transaction traces in a highly optimized database (e.g., Cassandra, InfluxDB) designed for logging or time-series data.
Advantages:
Better scalability for write-heavy workloads.
Easier to apply WORM policies or immutable designs.
Trade-offs:
Requires additional integration logic between the application database and the trace database.

Conclusion

Using PostGIS for both primary application data and transaction trace storage is viable with proper planning and architecture:

Leverage PostGIS’s spatial and relational capabilities for unified data management.
Implement partitioning, clustering, and Merkle root anchoring to address scalability and integrity concerns.
If needed, consider separate PostGIS instances or alternative storage solutions for transaction traces to minimize risks.

Ultimately, the design choice should align with the criticality of your forensic capabilities, performance needs, and scalability requirements.

Editor:
so i favour the use of 2 instances of PostGIS – ie one for enterprise app data and the other for storing transaction traces – would you agree that the use of 2 instances should be divided for both instances along business network lines so that the instances correspond in their scope of concern?

ChatGPT said:
ChatGPT

Yes, dividing the two instances of PostGIS (one for enterprise application data and the other for transaction traces) along business network lines
is a sound and logical strategy. Here’s why:
Rationale for Dividing PostGIS Instances Along Business Network Lines
1. Scope of Concern and Isolation

Application Instance:
Each business network has distinct application requirements, data models, and workflows.
Isolating enterprise data ensures that specific operational needs, queries, and performance optimization are tailored to that business network.
Trace Instance:
Transaction traces are also closely tied to the operations within each business network. Keeping trace data scoped to its corresponding
network simplifies:
Validation processes.
Trace-to-data cross-references.
Forensic investigations.

2. Enhanced Performance and Scalability

Reduced Query Contention:
Queries for enterprise data and transaction trace validation are separated, preventing I/O contention and improving performance.
Scalability:
Each instance can scale independently based on the needs of the corresponding business network.

3. Security and Compliance

Granular Access Control:
Business network-specific instances allow for finer control over access policies, ensuring that only authorized parties can access
sensitive data.
Compliance:
Different industries (e.g., healthcare vs. housing) may have unique compliance requirements (e.g., HIPAA for healthcare).
Separate instances help meet these requirements without cross-contaminating data.

4. Disaster Recovery and Fault Tolerance

Improved Recovery Scope:
If one instance (e.g., for healthcare) encounters a failure, only that network is impacted, not the others.
Independent Backups:
Business-specific backups simplify recovery and reduce the complexity of managing large datasets.

Proposed Architecture
1. Application Data Instance

Stores enterprise-specific data such as:
Customer information.
Transactions, orders, or services provided.
Operational metrics.
Business network-specific schemas ensure a clear separation of responsibilities.

2. Transaction Trace Instance

Stores transaction trace data:
Hashes, timestamps, and Merkle root-related information.
Cross-referenced IDs from the application instance for validation.
Partitioned by business network and time (e.g., monthly partitions) for optimal performance and easier archiving.

How This Division Maps to Business Networks

Instance 1: Housing Network
Application Database: Enterprise data specific to housing.
Trace Database: Tracks housing-related transaction traces.

Instance 2: Healthcare Network
Application Database: Enterprise data specific to healthcare.
Trace Database: Tracks healthcare-related transaction traces.

Shared Concerns:
Shared infrastructure elements like BFT-SMaRt, ChubbyChecker, and etcd for metadata management remain common across networks.
Use consistent ID structures across all instances to unify traceability and verification processes.

Considerations

Resource Allocation:
Ensure adequate CPU, memory, and storage are allocated to each instance based on the size and workload of each business network.

Inter-Network Queries:
If cross-network data queries are needed (e.g., housing supply chain linked to healthcare logistics),
a federated query system or ETL pipeline may be required.

Data Flow and Validation:
Use Merkle root anchoring (e.g., on Elastos Blockchain) to ensure that traces stored in the trace instance are verifiable and tamper-proof.

Backup and Archival:
Implement separate backup policies for application and trace instances, tailored to their distinct requirements for retention and recovery.

Conclusion

Dividing the two PostGIS instances along business network lines aligns with operational, security, and scalability requirements.
This approach minimizes risk, enhances performance, and supports domain-specific compliance while ensuring robust forensic capabilities
for transaction trace validation.

Editor:
could you provide a detailed structure for the transaction trace PostGIS database storage instance (please take a generic approach with the following fields) /**
* Method to execute a critical insert into the database.
*
* @param transactionId The ID of the transaction
* @param aRequest The GeneralMessage object containing the request details
* @param db The database name
* @param schema The schema name
* @param table The table name
* @param key The key value (recordId) for the insert operation
* @param values The numerical values list to be inserted into the table
* @param network The network identifier
* @param clientId The client ID requesting the operation
* @param txSignStr The transaction signature of the user/client
* @param opCodeExec The execution code (boolean – should always = true)
* @param opCodeCommit The commit code (boolean – true for was_committed)
* @param txUUID The transaction UUID
* @throws Exception
*/

ChatGPT said:
ChatGPT

Here is a detailed structure for a transaction trace PostGIS database instance that captures all the fields and requirements
you specified, while maintaining a generic approach. This structure ensures compatibility with various business networks,
supports forensic analysis, and adheres to relational database best practices.
Database: TransactionTraceDB

Purpose: To store and manage all transaction traces for forensic analysis, compliance, and traceability.

Schema: public
Table: transaction_traces

Description: Stores the core details of each transaction trace.
ColumnName DataType Constraints Description
trace_id UUID Primary Key Unique identifier for the transaction trace.
entnum long Primary Key Unique identifier for the enterprise (company).
network_id UUID Not Null Identifier for the network associated with the transaction.
member_class_id short Not Null Identifier for the member class in the network.
client_id UUID Not Null Identifier for the client initiating the transaction.
database_name TEXT Not Null Name of the target database.
schema_name TEXT Not Null Name of the schema in the target database.
table_name TEXT Not Null Name of the table in the target schema.
record_id UUID Not Null Key value (recordId) of the record associated with the transaction.
values JSONB Not Null Numerical or other data values being inserted/updated (stored as JSON for flexibility).
tx_signature TEXT Not Null Digital signature of the transaction for authentication and integrity verification.
op_code_exec BOOLEAN Default: False Execution code (indicates whether the operation was executed).
op_code_commit BOOLEAN Default: False Commit code (indicates whether the transaction was successfully committed).
tx_uuid UUID Not Null Unique identifier for the transaction operation (transaction UUID).
created_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE Default: CURRENT_TIMESTAMP Timestamp of when the transaction trace was created.
updated_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE Default: CURRENT_TIMESTAMP Timestamp of the last update to the transaction trace
(e.g., during forensic reconciliation).

Table: network_metadata

Description: Metadata about the networks participating in transaction traces.
ColumnName DataType Constraints Description
network_id UUID Primary Key Unique identifier for the network.
network_name TEXT Not Null Human-readable name of the network.
description TEXT Description of the network.
created_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE Default: CURRENT_TIMESTAMP Timestamp of when the network metadata was created.
updated_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE Default: CURRENT_TIMESTAMP Timestamp of the last update to the network metadata.

Table: clients

Description: Information about clients (users, devices) initiating transactions.
ColumnName DataType Constraints Description
client_id UUID Primary Key Unique identifier for the client.
client_name TEXT Not Null Human-readable name of the client.
public_key TEXT Public key of the client for signature verification.
created_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE Default: CURRENT_TIMESTAMP Timestamp of when the client record was created.
updated_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE Default: CURRENT_TIMESTAMP Timestamp of the last update to the client record.
Indexes

For fast lookups:
CREATE INDEX idx_transaction_traces_transaction_id ON transaction_traces(transaction_id);
CREATE INDEX idx_transaction_traces_network_id ON transaction_traces(network_id);
CREATE INDEX idx_transaction_traces_client_id ON transaction_traces(client_id);

For JSONB queries:
CREATE INDEX idx_transaction_traces_values ON transaction_traces USING gin(values);

Constraints

Foreign Key Relationships:
transaction_traces.network_id → network_metadata.network_id.
transaction_traces.client_id → clients.client_id.

Logical Constraints:
CHECK (op_code_exec = true OR op_code_commit = false):
Ensures that a transaction cannot be marked as committed if it wasn’t executed.
CHECK (values IS NOT NULL):
Prevents transactions without associated values from being stored.

Queries

Insert a New Trace:

INSERT INTO transaction_traces
(trace_id, transaction_id, network_id, client_id, database_name, schema_name, table_name, record_id, values, tx_signature, op_code_exec, op_code_commit, tx_uuid)
VALUES
(gen_random_uuid(), $1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8::JSONB, $9, $10, $11, $12);

Fetch Traces by Transaction ID:

SELECT * FROM transaction_traces WHERE transaction_id = $1;

Update Trace Status:

UPDATE transaction_traces
SET op_code_commit = true, updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
WHERE trace_id = $1;

Backup and Archiving

Partitioning by Time:
Add a partitioned_by field to separate traces into monthly/yearly partitions.
Use CREATE TABLE … PARTITION OF transaction_traces for better archiving.

Backup Strategy:
Use pg_dump for database-specific backups.
Regularly archive older traces into cold storage with pg_archive.

This structure ensures scalability, forensic accuracy, and performance while supporting efficient queries and cross-references.

Editor:
upon reviewing of the generics made possible by my trace extraction design, would you not agree that since any investigation would be led by my company it would be best to have only one transactionTraceDb as part of the central Control app?

ChatGPT said:
ChatGPT

Yes, having a single TransactionTraceDB as part of the central Control app makes sense for several reasons:
1. Centralized Control and Investigation

Streamlined Investigations: A single, centralized transaction trace database allows your company to lead investigations without the need to
synchronize or query multiple distributed trace storage systems across business domains.
Holistic View: Investigators can access transaction traces across all domains (e.g., health, housing, etc.) from one location,
ensuring no gaps in the investigation process.

2. Simplified Data Integrity and Verification

Unified Merkle Root Verification: With one database, the process of verifying Merkle roots becomes more straightforward, as there is no need
to aggregate hashes or compare between distributed databases.
Consistent Security Policies: A single database instance can enforce uniform security, access control, and trace validation procedures,
reducing the risk of misconfigurations or inconsistencies.

3. Cost and Operational Efficiency

Reduced Overhead: Managing one trace database reduces administrative overhead compared to maintaining separate instances for each business domain.
Centralized Backup and Archiving: Backups and archives can be managed centrally, reducing the complexity and cost of storing and securing
transaction traces.

4. Compatibility with Generic Middleware Design

Generics by Design: Since your middleware is designed to be largely generic and domain-independent, having one centralized trace database
aligns with this philosophy. Each transaction trace record already includes fields like network_id or client_id, which allow for clear
differentiation by domain or business network.
Uniform Query Structures: Investigators can use consistent queries across all domains, leveraging the generic design to filter by network_id,
schema, or table.

5. Enhanced Forensic and Audit Capabilities

Cross-Domain Correlation: With a centralized repository, it becomes easier to identify patterns or anomalies that span across
business networks. For instance:
Detecting coordinated tampering attempts affecting multiple domains.
Identifying systemic issues in transaction execution or verification.
Central Authority: Your company retains full control over the transaction trace database, ensuring that forensic capabilities remain uncompromised
by potential interference from domain-specific stakeholders.

6. Scalability and Modularity

Logical Separation: Even within a single centralized database, traces can be logically separated by domain using fields like network_id or
even by schemas (e.g., health_traces, housing_traces).
Future Expansion: If the need arises to expand into new domains, the centralized database can simply include new network_ids or schemas,
avoiding the complexity of setting up additional trace storage systems.

Challenges and Mitigations
Challenge Mitigation
Scalability Concerns Use partitioning (e.g., by time or network) and indexing to ensure the database remains performant.
Single Point of Failure Implement robust replication and failover strategies using PostgreSQL clustering.
Access Control Across Domains Implement role-based access control (RBAC) to restrict access to domain-specific traces.
Higher Centralization Risk Ensure rigorous monitoring and auditing to detect unauthorized access or tampering.
Conclusion

A single, centralized TransactionTraceDB as part of the Control app is the optimal choice for forensic reliability, operational simplicity,
and alignment with your middleware’s generic design. It also enhances your company’s ability to manage and secure transaction traces while
facilitating seamless cross-domain investigations.

Editor:
so at this point i am wondering whether to move to a BFT-SMaRt-compliant system, eliminating timestamps and replacing them with BlockHeight recordings, for the TransactionTraceDb itself to align with all the other databases?

ChatGPT said:
ChatGPT

Moving to a BFT-SMaRt-compliant system for the TransactionTraceDb and replacing timestamps with BlockHeight recordings is a logical step
if your goal is to align the transaction trace storage with the other BFT-SMaRt-governed databases. Here’s a detailed evaluation of the benefits,
considerations, and potential implementation challenges:
Benefits of Aligning TransactionTraceDb with BFT-SMaRt
1. Determinism and Byzantine Fault Tolerance

Consistency: By replacing timestamps (non-deterministic) with BlockHeight recordings, every trace becomes deterministic, aligning
perfectly with BFT-SMaRt’s consensus-driven nature.
Fault Tolerance: Using BFT-SMaRt ensures that all replicas of the TransactionTraceDb maintain identical states,
even in the presence of Byzantine faults.

2. Unified Architecture

Simplified Operations: Aligning the TransactionTraceDb with the same architecture as other databases simplifies administration and operational
strategies. Cross-Domain Queries: With all databases adhering to a consistent schema (including BlockHeight), cross-domain analysis becomes more
intuitive and faster.

3. Enhanced Auditability

Immutable Records: BlockHeight provides a natural ordering mechanism, and any discrepancies in trace ordering become easily detectable.
Verification: Merkle root calculations can directly integrate BlockHeight, ensuring consistency and traceability across the entire system.

4. Performance Gains

Reduced Metadata Overhead: Eliminating timestamps reduces variability in data input and may marginally improve performance, especially
in indexing and storage efficiency.

Challenges and Considerations
1. Transition Complexity

Data Migration: Historical data using timestamps will need to be converted or supplemented with corresponding BlockHeight values.
Schema Changes: The database schema must be updated to reflect the switch to BlockHeight recordings.

2. Real-Time Queries

Human Readability: Timestamps are inherently more human-readable than BlockHeight. For real-time or user-facing queries, additional
mapping might be required to present timestamp-like values.
External System Integration: If external systems rely on timestamp metadata, you’ll need a compatibility layer or mapping strategy.

3. Increased Coordination

BlockHeight Accuracy: The accuracy of BlockHeight as a substitute for timestamps depends on the frequency of
block generation and the granularity required by your trace storage.
Synchronization: All systems must agree on the BlockHeight source to prevent mismatches across replicas.

Implementation Strategy
1. Schema Design

Add a block_height field to replace the timestamp.
Index the block_height field for fast retrieval and sorting.

2. Integration with BFT-SMaRt

Use BFT-SMaRt to manage consensus on transaction trace entries.
Generate BlockHeight values from the BFT-SMaRt middleware or an external system that tracks the blockchain state.

3. Migration Plan

Map existing timestamps to corresponding BlockHeight values during migration. You can achieve this by:
Aligning transaction timestamps to the nearest BlockHeight from historical data.
Preserving timestamps as a secondary field for reference during the transition.

4. Querying Adjustments

Implement a helper function to convert block_height into an approximate timestamp when needed (e.g., for user interfaces or reports).
For audit and forensic purposes, train your tools and teams to use BlockHeight as the primary identifier.

5. Testing and Validation

Perform extensive validation to ensure BlockHeight recordings are consistent across replicas.
Test edge cases such as fork resolution and delayed block generation to ensure trace integrity.

Example Schema

CREATE TABLE transaction_traces (
transaction_id UUID PRIMARY KEY,
block_height BIGINT NOT NULL,
transaction_data JSONB NOT NULL,
network_id UUID NOT NULL,
client_id UUID NOT NULL,
transaction_signature TEXT NOT NULL,
operation_executed BOOLEAN NOT NULL,
operation_committed BOOLEAN NOT NULL,
transaction_uuid UUID NOT NULL,
FOREIGN KEY (block_height) REFERENCES blocks (block_height)
);

Conclusion

Switching to a BFT-SMaRt-compliant system for the TransactionTraceDb with BlockHeight as a
replacement for timestamps provides a unified, deterministic, and tamper-proof architecture
across your entire application stack. It simplifies Merkle root verification, enhances consistency,
and aligns perfectly with your system’s Byzantine Fault Tolerant design philosophy.

While this shift introduces challenges in transition and integration, the long-term benefits of
determinism, auditability, and a unified system architecture outweigh the initial costs.

 

 

Summary of ChubbyChecker Operation

One Bucordo node per member or member- class, with substrate database server, the server running BFT-SMaRt Java package, each replicating from their own substrate servers to all other Bucordo nodes, which then each complete the replication, via their own BFT-SMaRt applications (to their own substrate servers) in a 6 stage process. Communication is achieved via Notifications. (Replicating to a Bucordo node involves only a notification).

Trust is policed programmatically as follows:

1. The first stage is to cause ordering then execution of submitted transactions in Blocks. This is the initial ordering/execution/replication process.
2. The second stage is to commit or abort the same executed transactions, using IBM’s SSI (Serialisable Snapshot Isolation) heuristic to determine which transactions need to be aborted (rolled-back).
3. Substrate Masters (“lagerhaus”) send their own State-Change Hashes to their own additional system tables that store brief details of Transactions and Transaction_Blocks. These Hashes must be identical across nodes. An alarm is broadcast, otherwise, to all Stakeholders. A Contingency Plan is implemented if an Alarm State exists.
4. This State-Change Hash is added to the next Block, currently being formed, early in stage 2 above.
5. The penultimate stage involves a Checkpointing process, which the IBM article indicates should be performed at less than the rate of once per Block-Committal (for efficient performance and optimum outcomes – mainly to minimise false positives), on the Substrate Masters, with an outcome of Rolling Back any remaining inconsistent Transactions. Inconsistent transactions at this stage raise a Warning, with Status to be confirmed at the next Ultimate check, which is broadcast to all stakeholders, and Contingency Plans are implemented. The detection of False positives is an essential part of the process at this stage.
6. Before finalising the cycle, a Consistency Check is run against the Elastos Blockchain’s records of Transaction Traces. If Stage 5 above were completed without incident, but if the Ordering services had acted in collusion with the cooperation of > 33% of Sites, or if external hackers have been involved, in order to defraud the system, this situation would still not have been detected. To achieve the detection of such a situation, Transaction Traces are recorded as objects, or “Assets”, on the Elastos Blockchain before being executed on the databases. As each Block of Transactions is executed, replicated and then committed (or aborted), after “home” Transactions are recorded, further Assets are added on the neighbouring nodes and, Block-by-Block, their Traces are registered on the Elastos chain, resulting in comprehensive lists of 1024 individual Pre-registered Transaction Trace files x 24, ie 24 x 2 files/node x N(i) – the number of nodes in Installation [i] containing original Transaction Traces formed into Blocks, with identical Trace Orderings, as the other nodes in an installation replicate and order the original transactions. Anti-Fraud checking, will be driven by reviewing the records of the Assets (Transaction Traces) registered on the immutable Elastos Blockchain, with the intention of investigating the status of external and internal consistency of the Transaction Traces. The content of these objects will be influenced by the status of the recorded files, with fields for “executed”, and either “rolled-back” or “committed”, “amount”, Client details, “TxUUID”, “BlSeq” (k), etc. Notice that, across nodes, for a series of Assets with identical Original TxUUIDs, either |{executed tx}| = |{committed tx}| OR |{executed tx}| = |{rolled-back tx}|, or inconsistency exists. In all cases the length of the series with identical original TxUUIDs must equal the number of nodes in the installation being examined. Unique transaction traces, will be registered with unique TxUUIDs (driven by the Tx(UUID)s + the Node Ids generated by our own applications at Pre-Registration) at the different stages of their lives (exec, possibly rolled-back, probably committed) to form a series of records of the history of the uniquely identified transaction traces. There are also possible “False Positive” indications. Please refer to the section below for a comprehensive list of Internal Consistency Checks. Overall the cross-checking relies on the pre-registered traces to enforce external consistency.

This completes the 6-stage production cycle, incorporating Fraud checks.

1. 1. When the databases are rolled out they will have a structure of schemata, tables and columns identical to each other, but also with an extra 6 new tables per installation (postgres_system.public.certs, postgres_system.public.blockstore, postgres_system.public.blocks_transactions, postgres_system.public.ledger_preregister, postgres_system.public.ledger_postregister_exec & postgres_system.public.ledger_postregister_commit), located in a postgres_system.public database/schema in the cluster. There will also be new “update_ledger_postregister_exec” & “update_ledger_postregister_commit” triggers (one of each per ordinary table throughout the databases) and trigger functions (one of each per ordinary schema in the databases), and the new “update_block_count” trigger and function (fired by the new postgres_system.public.ledger_postregister_commit table) targeting the new postgres_system.public.blockstore system table in the postgres database. The records in the postgres_system.public.ledger_postregister_exec & postgres_system.public.ledger_postregister_commit tables are updated by the firing of the “update_ledger_postregister_exec” & “update_ledger_postregister_commit” triggers. On the postgres_system.public.ledger_postregister_commit table, the “update_block_count” trigger only fires once upon committing every T unique transactions. Note that the Tx(UUID)s are created at Pre-Registration (by the receiving load balancers for the V.M.’s), and inserted into each query subsequently processed, leading to automatic inclusion of uuid’s upon replication. The transactions are identified by their multiply-copied originating TxUUID’s combined with the node ID upon which the current TxUUID is being replicated. When postgres_system.public.ledger_postregister_commit has counted ‘T’ unique transactions, (where unique TxUUID’s are being counted on postgres_system.public.ledger_postregister_commit as the ordinary schemata have been firing their own “update_ledger_postregister_exec” & “update_ledger_postregister_commit” triggers upon executing & committing the ordered transactions. Thus, there will be N(i) copies of each TxUUID in each of the 2 tables postgres_system.public.ledger_postregister_exec & postgres_system.public.ledger_postregister_commit – the number of nodes in the installation), “update_block_count” is fired and postgres_system.public.blockstore.BlSeq is incremented, along with updates of the other fields in postgres_system.public.blockstore, on behalf of all databases in the installation, and postgres_system.public.blockstore is locked until BFT-SMaRt has committed the ordered Block. The information included in these records is drawn from postgres_system.public.ledger_postregister_commit’s own database records.
      Currently, T = 1024.
   2. As Blocks are committed, the “postgres_system.public.blockstore” table is keeping a cyclic count of committed Blocks (in the BlSeq field), ie being updated by firings of the update_block_count trigger on the new postgres_system.public.ledger_postregister_commit table, with an enum operating on “postgres_system.public.blockstore” which runs from 0 to K-1. When that postgres_system.public.blockstore.BlSeq enum reaches a count of K-1, the enum resets, and a Notification is broadcast to the Chubby-Post-Register and ChubbyChecker containers announcing the end of an Ultimate-Registration Phase (when the number of Blocks committed reaches ‘K’), thus signalling the commencement of the next ChubbyChecker round of checks.
      Currently, K = 24.
   3. With regard to the method of recording the preregistered transaction states, the load balancer onboard each virtual machine, intercepts each transaction, and writes the required detail, encrypted, to the Blockchain as a file or as a smart contract, also recording the returned FileID in a JSON file which is accessible to the ChubbyRegister container attached to the ‘home’ transaction database for each transaction. Upon Transaction Execution and also upon Transaction Commitment/Roll-back, the lists of a. Executed. b. Committed and. c. Aborted Transactions are written as a Block of details to Elastos, sourced from the orderer nodes rather than the databases. The associated ChubbyRegister container reads the Elastos files after Commitment of the current Block of transactions, and creates database requests from the file contents, using the list of transactions by UUID contained in the Block (as recorded in the Elastos records of content of the current Committed Block), assigning correct BlSeq and block_id values, and writing the Pre-Registered transaction details to the postgres_system.public.ledger_preregister table on the postgres database for the installation. (OpCodeExec, OpCodeCommit will all have the value “false”). The foregoing actions occur independently on each node, thus resulting in databases which have their Pre-Registration details completely updated, and ready to be cross-checked, thus securely defining the boundaries of one Block of Pre-Registered Transaction Traces, a posteriori.

(thus implying that
1. each Orderer Node has an Application Id &
2. that the current Block has passed the Consistency checks (Process 6)).

Following the lead of IBM, we are looking towards the BFT-SMaRt Byzantine Fault Tolerant Transaction Replication & Ordering Service, which is to be installed on each Peer Bucordo node, accepting input from the “gRPC-servlet” module on the Smartweb server. The Bucordo Ordering peers (BFT-SMaRt Client & Server) co-reside with the gRPC servlet, the Elastos Carrier/DID system and the Chubby-Post-Register and ChubbyChecker containers in several “pods” on a virtual machine altogether comprising one “node” when the database is included: there are 6 to 8 nodes per vm, and 4 vm’s on our development workstation.

Replicação da máquina de estado bizantina para as massas

Byzantine State Machine Replication for the Masses

We initially assessed 10 major risks associated with migrating to a bft-dht System. We have incorporated a total of 86 checks (covering additional technical risks 11 through 97) in ‘ChubbyChecker’.
At the completion of Registration of the Kth Block (ie at the end of each Ultimate Registration Phase), we begin the following set of 86 Checks:
Check ALL the following conditions are MET, else ALARM STATE:
(Note that currently the number of Blocks
in a single Ultimate Registration/Checking Phase, K = 24,
and there are designed to be 1024 Transactions per block)

• Mitigate Weakness_11:

  consists of the requirement that, Across all nodes, after each block of transaction commit procedures, all the State-Change Hashes recorded by all replicas (ie nodes) must be identical.

• Mitigate Weakness_12:

  Node Identities: Verify that the nodes involved in the consensus process are the expected, authorized nodes.

• Mitigate Weakness_13:

  across all transactions, in Post-Registration-execute and in Post- Registration-commit/abort phases, block sequence numbers must be continuous.

• Mitigate Weakness_14:

  In the Pre-Registration files, ostensibly conitnuous among the K Blocks, the Traces cannot be divided into Blocks a priori. However by writing a block marker file to the etcd/DHT system when each block (ie decided by machinic consensus) is denoted and recording the TxUUIDs contained in the block, and writing an encrypted file with that Smart Contract’s Id, locally (ie to the vm or “installation”), ChubbyChecker can assign traces, from the Preregistration Stage, to blocks, and check Block continuity a posteriori. Using this method, on each node, the total of Preregistered (submitted) Transactions in one Ultimate Checking Phase must equal (total of TxUUID’s executed) – in the Post-Registration-execute phase – AND must equal (total of TxUUID’s committed + total of TxUUID’s aborted) in the Post-Registration-commit/abort phase, across all Post-Registered Blocks in the same Checking Phase.

• Mitigate Weakness_15:

  Across all nodes, and for both Post-Registration-execute and Post- Registration-commit/abort phases, for a set of transactions in BlockSeq (k), with TxUUID = z: ([Total of TxUUID’s with opCodeExec == “true”] == [Total of TxUUID’s with opCodeCommit == “true”] OR [Total of TxUUID’s with opCodeExec == “true”] == [Total of TxUUID’s with opCodeAbort == “true”]) AND len{TxUUID = z} = N(i), the Number of nodes in the installation [i] being examined , for all (k, z) in [i]. (Transactions in k determined a posteriori from phase (c), as in Mitigate Weakness_14).

• Mitigate Weakness_16: Block Hash Integrity:

  Validate that the block hash matches the expected value, confirming that the block has not been tampered with.

• Mitigate Weakness_17: Transaction Hash Integrity:

  Verify the integrity of individual transactions within the block by checking their hashes.

• • Mitigate Weakness_18: State Consistency:

  Ensure that the state after each block execution is consistent across all nodes, reflecting correct and deterministic execution.

• Mitigate Weakness_19: Commit Consistency:

  Confirm that the blocks committed by different nodes are identical, with no divergence in the blockchain.

• Mitigate Weakness_20: Byzantine Fault Detection:

  Analyze any discrepancies in node responses to detect possible Byzantine behavior.

• Mitigate Weakness_21: Message Authenticity:

  Verify that all messages exchanged between nodes during the consensus process are authentic and correctly signed.

• Mitigate Weakness_22: Network Partition Detection:

  Detect any network partitions or communication issues that might have influenced the consensus process.

• Mitigate Weakness_23: Latency and Timing Consistency:

  Ensure that the timing of block commits and transaction execution is within expected bounds, identifying any anomalies that could indicate manipulation or delays.

• Mitigate Weakness_24: Redundant Storage Consistency:

  Verify that redundant copies of transaction data and state information are consistent across nodes.

• Mitigate Weakness_25: Recovery Point Integrity:

  Ensure that the recovery points or checkpoints created during the process are accurate and can be used to restore the system state if needed.

• Mitigate Weakness_26: Across all checked transactions

  (Pre-Registration-submit, Post- Registration-execute and Post-Registration-commit/abort phases), each signature is traceable to a current client from the current installation’s range of member-class servers’ (ie nodes’) clients.

• Mitigate Weakness_27: Across all checked transactions,

  the ‘entnum’ field in the transaction’s contents, when compared to the client’s registered ‘entnum’, must match.

• Mitigate Weakness_28: Across all checked transactions,

  the ‘schema’ field in the transaction’s contents, when compared to the client’s available ‘schemata’, must match one item. These are fully qualified names ie database.schema.table.

• Mitigate Weakness_29: Phantom Write

  A transaction appears to commit, but state is not reflected on all nodes. Detected by: Interceptor’s pre-block record vs post-slab snapshot Missing keys/rows in PostGIS after commit

• Mitigate Weakness_30: Lost Rollback

  A rollback request was issued but at least one node still applied the transaction. Detected by: Interceptor snapshot shows txn = pending, slab shows txn = applied Mismatch in rollback marker across nodes

• Mitigate Weakness_31: Out-of-Order Commit

  Transaction T2 committed before T1, violating causality or application-level ordering. Detected by: Timestamp or block height comparison Violation of vector clock or logical clock constraints

• Mitigate Weakness_32: Replica Divergence

  Two or more nodes apply the same transaction with different outcomes (e.g., amounts, timestamps). Detected by: Node-wise comparison of trace outcomes Hash/Merkle mismatch across replicas

• Mitigate Weakness_33: Replay Detection Failure

  A previously committed transaction is accepted again as if new (e.g., due to hash collision, retry abuse). Detected by: Duplicate transaction hash in slab Non-monotonic nonce reuse

• Mitigate Weakness_34: Inter-slab Drift

  • A transaction committed in slab N is reflected differently in slab N+1 (e.g., metadata vs actual state). Detected by: Metadata slab summary mismatch Commit cross-reference checks (super- checker logic)

• Mitigate Weakness_35: Transaction Gap

  • Missing transaction in the expected slab range (e.g., slabs show txns 100–124, but 117 is missing). Detected by: Monotonic counter comparison Range scans with missing indices

• Mitigate Weakness_36: Clock Skew Violation

  • A node reports a commit time outside slab boundaries or before it saw prior events. Detected by: Comparing slab timestamps and txn timestamps across nodes Logical vs wall clock drift detection

• Mitigate Weakness_37: Stale Read/Write

  • A node uses a version of data that’s behind consensus state (write skew, old snapshot). Detected by: Comparing pre-block data with committed data Cross-checking snapshot IDs or transaction IDs used during execution

• Mitigate Weakness_38: Write Amplification Error

  • A single transaction causes multiple unintended writes (e.g., duplicate rows, unintended triggers). Detected by: PostGIS trace diff exceeds expected write footprint Interceptor baseline vs actual write set

• Mitigate Weakness_39: Partial Metadata Commit

  • A transaction’s metadata was committed, but its payload wasn’t (or vice versa). Detected by: Comparing metadata slab to enterprise slab Supernode-specific slab parity checks

• Mitigate Weakness_40: Invalid Trace Termination

  • A transaction trace does not reach a terminal state (commit, abort, etc.). Detected by: Orphaned trace entries in slab Missing status = final marker in logs

• Mitigate Weakness_41: Ghost Transaction

  • A transaction exists in traces but not in slab metadata or committed state. Detected by: Slab metadata doesn’t account for an otherwise traceable transaction Missing block or tx hash in ledger indexes

• Mitigate Weakness_42: Misrouted Transaction

  • A transaction appears on a node not responsible for its class or shard. Detected by: Node role mismatch vs transaction class Supernode incorrectly applying leaf-level transactions

• Mitigate Weakness_43: State Bleed

  • Data from a previous transaction or node incorrectly appears in a new one. Detected by: Unexpected field values or foreign keys Orphaned joins across slabs

• Mitigate Weakness_44: Metadata Omission

  • Metadata slab lacks traceable linkage to underlying enterprise transactions. Detected by: No matching slab ID, txn ID, or hash from metadata to main trace Hash chain break in Merkle anchoring • Data from a previous transaction or node incorrectly appears in a new one. Detected by: Unexpected field values or foreign keys Orphaned joins across slabs

• Mitigate Weakness_45: Incomplete Propagation

  A valid transaction is present on some nodes but entirely missing on others. Detected by: gRPC/QUIC checker receives “unknown transaction” errors from subset of nodes Missing consensus message on affected replicas

• Mitigate Weakness_46: Signature Mismatch

  Digital signature or identity on a transaction is invalid or unverifiable. Detected by: Signature fails verification against stored pubkey Signature valid but from unexpected signer

• Mitigate Weakness_47: Block Hash Mismatch

  • A slab’s hash root differs between nodes for the same slab ID. Detected by: Merkle root or hash mismatch in slab headers Inconsistent metadata anchoring

• Mitigate Weakness_48: Cyclic Transaction Dependency

  • A transaction depends on another transaction that, transitively, depends back on it. Detected by: Dependency graph cycle in trace metadata Impossible causality

• Mitigate Weakness_49: Orphaned Commit

  • A commit was logged, but no corresponding execution trace or context exists. Detected by: status=committed, but missing execute or prepare phase in trace Unexpected commit timestamp with null origin

• Mitigate Weakness_50: Multi-Node Conflict

  • Two nodes report different accepted transactions for the same logical slot. Detected by: Slot- based ledger conflict Concurrent append without conflict resolution

• Mitigate Weakness_51: Nonce Reuse

  • A client or process reused a nonce or unique identifier, resulting in conflicting operations. Detected by: Multiple transactions with identical nonces and different contents Consensus dispute on transaction ID uniqueness

• Mitigate Weakness_52: State Lag

  • A node accepts and executes a transaction using stale global state. snapshot/version ID Prior commit not visible during execution

• Mitigate Weakness_53: Inconsistent Rollback Outcome

  • Rollback succeeded on some nodes but left partial effects elsewhere. Detected by: Stale Detected by: Residual entries in PostGIS from rolled-back transactions Uneven rollback markers across replicas

• Mitigate Weakness_54: Anomaly Window Leak

  • A transaction that should not be visible yet is observable by another in the same slab. by: Temporal ordering violations between transactions Snapshot isolation breach

• Mitigate Weakness_55: • Cross-Shard Drift

  A cross-shard transaction commits parts in different slabs (or commits in one, not another). Mismatched slab IDs for shard-aligned operations Atomic cross-shard violation

• Mitigate Weakness_56: Audit Trail Omission

  • A transaction completed, but audit logging or trace proof is missing or incomplete. Detected Detected by: Detected by: Lack of external anchoring (e.g., Hedera hash) Empty or truncated audit trail entries in metadata

• Mitigate Weakness_57: Transport-Level Mismatch

  • A transaction hash or slab root differs in transport versus what the node actually committed. Detected by: Comparing gRPC/QUIC pushed headers vs actual PostGIS state Ensuring message headers don’t mask node-specific drift

• Mitigate Weakness_58: Double Acknowledgment

  • A transaction is acknowledged as committed twice with different metadata (timestamp, trace ID). Detected by: Conflicting ACK or commit records in metadata slabs Mismatch in quorum acknowledgement count

• Mitigate Weakness_59: Failed Rollback with Success Signal

  • Node reports rollback success but internal state still mutated. Detected by: Compare rollback trace with actual PostGIS record Trace ends in “rolled back” but values differ from original

• Mitigate Weakness_60: Log Rewind or Overwrite

  • Node replays or overwrites log entries without emitting a slab boundary. Detected by: Sequence ID reversal in logs or non-monotonic slab offsets Unexpected gap or repeat in block IDs

• Mitigate Weakness_61: Query Path Drift

  • Identical queries return different results across nodes for the same slab. Detected by: Compare SELECT results per node post-check Look for index path inconsistencies or filters applied differently

• Mitigate Weakness_62 Slab Compression Divergence

  • Slab compression or delta encoding introduces non-determinism across nodes. Detected by: Hash mismatch after decompression Bitwise diff on slab archives

• Mitigate Weakness_63: Anchoring Drift

  • The slab anchoring (e.g., to Hedera) differs in hash or timestamp from the actual slab content. Detected by: Hash anchor vs recomputed Merkle root of slab Anchored timestamp older than actual slab write

• Mitigate Weakness_64 Transaction Range Overlap

  • Slabs overlap in transaction ranges due to misaligned boundary commits. Detected by: Block N shows transactions 100–124; Block N+1 starts at 120 Double application or accidental replay of trailing txns

• Mitigate Weakness_65: Slow Commit Visibility

  • Slab committed but one or more nodes remain unaware past acceptable delay. Detected by: Slab version visible on node A but unknown on node B after timeout Exceeds MaxSlabDrift threshold

• Mitigate Weakness_66: Persistence Loss

  • A slab was committed, but lost from persistent storage on restart or crash. Detected by: Slab metadata exists in memory, missing from disk query lsn mismatch on restart

• Mitigate Weakness_67: Unreachable Commit Path

  • A commit path or confirmation quorum is missing or invalid (e.g., quorum never finalized). Detected by: No quorum metadata for committed transaction Failed BFT round leaves orphaned commit trail

• Mitigate Weakness_68: Schema Drift Between Nodes

  • One or more nodes apply schema changes (DDL) inconsistently across slabs. Detected by: Comparing pg_attribute, pg_class, or hash of information_schema Slab trace references column not present in schema

• Mitigate Weakness_69: Redundant Slab Execution

  • A slab’s transactions are re-applied after already having been committed. Detected by: Slab ID reuse in logs Double-application markers (e.g., timestamps increase, data unchanged)

• Mitigate Weakness_70: Transaction ID Reordering

  • Global transaction ID sequencing is violated across nodes. Detected by: Non-monotonic txID comparison between nodes Reordered slab input despite consistent timestamps

• Mitigate Weakness_71: Slab Freezing Without Finalization

  • A slab stops receiving transactions but never emits a finalized or anchored state. Detected by: Slab length == 24, but no commit/anchor entry Trace exists, but slab footer missing or corrupted

• Mitigate Weakness_72: Partial Crash Recovery

  • Node restarts mid-slab but applies only a subset of the original transactions. Detected by: Fewer rows in slab N on one node vs others Gaps in LSN or checkpoint mismatch after restart

• Mitigate Weakness_73: Interceptor State Desync

  • The interceptor captured pre-block trace but missed or misaligned commit result. Detected by: Interceptor trace exists without matching committed trace Pre-block txnID has no post-commit pair

• Mitigate Weakness_74: Inverted Causality via Metadata

  • Metadata slab reflects future state inconsistent with current slab content. Detected by: Metadata slab shows post-commit results before actual data slab is committed Cross-slab hash references violate forward-only progression

• Mitigate Weakness_75: Multi-Stage Transaction Collapse

  • Multi-stage transactions (e.g., prepare → commit) collapse to a single action without intermediate state. Detected by: Lack of prepare or validation entries Atomic txn seen only at commit with no earlier context

• Mitigate Weakness_76: Metrics/Telemetry Mismatch

  • System telemetry reports successful execution inconsistent with actual slab content. Detected by: Prometheus/gRPC reports txn OK, but not in slab Metrics count vs slab tx count mismatch

• Mitigate Weakness_77: Immutable Slab Mutation

  • A slab marked immutable (finalized, anchored) is altered in subsequent traces. Detected by: Slab hash differs from previously anchored hash gRPC or PostGIS responses differ over time for slab ID

• Mitigate Weakness_78: Slab Boundary Drift

  • The slab boundary (24 txns) is not consistently respected, causing overflow or underflow. Detected by: Node slab has 26 or 22 transactions Metadata contradicts boundary definitions

• Mitigate Weakness_79: Inconsistent Autogeneration

  • Auto-generated values (e.g., UUIDs, serials) differ for the same transaction across nodes. Detected by: UUID mismatch for rows with identical trace ID Sequence counters desynchronized between nodes

• Mitigate Weakness_80: Missing Event Propagation

  • A slab-triggered event (e.g., a downstream signal or webhook) is emitted by some nodes, not others. Detected by: Observed webhook receipts or logs vs actual slab commits gRPC downstream calls missing for valid slab

• Mitigate Weakness_81: Transaction Alias Collision

  • Transactions with different intents share the same alias or application-level ID. Detected by: Alias → txnID mapping is 1→N when it should be 1→1 Same alias used in conflicting contexts across nodes

• Mitigate Weakness_82: Ledger Height Skew

  • Nodes disagree on what block height a transaction or slab resides in. Detected by: Conflicting height metadata across slabs Merkle roots differ due to offset placement

• Mitigate Weakness_83: Invalid Cross-Entity Reference

  • A transaction links entities (accounts, records) that never co-existed in valid state. Detected by: Join trace shows impossible lifecycle overlap Temporal windows for referenced entities don’t align

• Mitigate Weakness_84: Anchor Reorg Violation

  • A previously anchored slab is altered due to ledger “reorg” or anchoring change without traceability. Detected by: Hedera/anchoring mismatch over time Anchored slab hash mutation or rollback

• Mitigate Weakness_85: Checksum Drift Between Redundant Stores

  A slab stored in both PostGIS and another mirror (e.g., S3, IPFS) yields different checksums. Detected by: Slab hash or canonical serialization differs between stores Compression, encoding, or serialization logic diverges

• Mitigate Weakness_86: Trace Count Disagreement

  The number of trace records per transaction differs across nodes. Detected by: One node shows 6 trace entries, another 5, for the same txn Missing intermediate state logs (e.g., prepare, validate)

• Mitigate Weakness_87: Stale Recovery View After Recovery

  , a node reports slab data that is provably older than committed state. Detected by: Restart causes node to expose pre-commit view Node rejoins with slab hashes not matching current state

• Mitigate Weakness_88: Behavioral Drift Between Node Versions

  Nodes running different logic versions diverge on transaction execution or metadata inclusion. by: Version tags differ in trace headers Execution outcome differs on same inputs

• Mitigate Weakness_89: Replay Window Violation Detected A replay protection mechanism accepts a transaction outside its valid nonce/timestamp window. Detected by: Transaction accepted far outside expected slab time Same txn ID replayed without triggering conflict

• Mitigate Weakness_90: Context-Detached Execution

  A transaction executes without its required context (e.g., missing authorization, state binding). Detected by: Context reference ID present but data not loaded Null context fields on node A, populated on node B

• Mitigate Weakness_91: Unconsumed Compensation Logic

  A rollback triggers compensation logic, but it’s ignored or never emitted. Detected by: Rollback triggers in trace, but no matching compensation row Post-state inconsistent with rollback plan

• Mitigate Weakness_92: Immutable Event Re-Emission

  An event marked immutable (e.g., external webhook or anchor) is emitted again under new data. Detected by: Event ID reused with new payload Immutable status tag violated

• Mitigate Weakness_93: Slab Interleaving with External System

  Slab timing intersects or overlaps with external system epochs incorrectly. Detected by: Slab timestamp range crosses time boundary expected to isolate Out-of-order events between slab and blockchain anchor

• Mitigate Weakness_94: Inverted Entitlement

  A node without permission executes or includes a transaction it should not. Detected by: Role-check fails on trace but transaction accepted Write by unauthorized class (e.g., peer writes supernode data)

• Mitigate Weakness_95: Partial Merkle Proof Failure

  A node includes only part of a Merkle proof chain, or reuses proofs across slabs. incomplete, hash path mismatch Proof reused when recomputation expected

• Mitigate Weakness_96: Immutable Field Overwrite

  A field marked immutable by schema or trace constraints is altered post-commit. multiple values across slabs for same txn Immutable tag present in slab schema

• Mitigate Weakness_97: Commit Without Quorum Inclusion

  A transaction is marked committed but lacks quorum evidence or BFT proof. Detected by: Proof Detected by: Field has Detected by: No quorum round data or consensus record BFT logs missing for slab, commit hash not reconstructable

Check_0 Consists of the requirement that, Across all nodes, after each block of transaction commit processes, all the State-Change Hashes recorded by all replicas (ie nodes) must be identica

For full Security Compliance, this Check, along with Checks _11 to _97 above, can only be performed after all proposed database alterations have been completed.

As soon as any of these checks returns a positive Fault, an Alarm is multicast, whereupon the databases in the offended installation are shutdown gracefully, IoT operations for the relevant installation(s) are overridden and set to “Operation without Database”, and then the affected databases are restarted in ‘Investigation’ mode, with ordinary users and operators excluded.

All the preceding checks have been implemented as GO! functions within the ChubbyChecker package, without full cooperation of the database operations, until after completion of source code alterations.

The “Das_Fuhrwerk” server(s) in the offended installation(s) is the basis from which we conduct investigations (it has an ‘investigations’ table). It falls to Executive Directors and the CEO, CFO and CIO to conduct the investigations. Database, ChubbyChecker and ChubbyRegister log files are examined. The alarm will have been issued with a Code attached. The meaning of the code accompanies the announcement, and will correspond to one or more of the checks outlined above. It is not possible, obviously, to predict the course and duration of the Root Cause Analysis.

The idea is to utilise the initial buffered command line input prompts, in main.go, for trusted staff to issue Status Update broadcasts as the investigation proceeds. All data entered into the Investigations Table is reviewed by ITOTCCA directors and is made available to Officers of Companies involved in the offended Installation(s), to check transparently the logic of conclusions drawn and evidence provided. Note that the first line of examination attempts to define whether the fault constitutes a “False Positive”.

Normally, only 1 installation would be in an “offended” state at any time, however we do not rely on this. Multicasts are restricted to officers of companies within offending/offended installations.

 

Executive Summary

Summarising, what you get is a system that enables automated trading using Smart Contracts that are enacted on a private network, and where, due to the ability to share information with supply/health partners, using asymmetric cryptography, and also due to all database clusters acting as Masters in replication procedures, a partner organisation can access the shared data on their own local server. Sharing may also be completely revoked.

You also get a comprehensive Enterprise Application that works on Mobile devices and provides all accounting as part of the package, where the database we use (PostgreSQL) has zero licence fees, yet we can offer a 99.999% uptime guarantee (with Enterprise DB Support), excluding any down time due to the perpetration of “external” fraud (which will be detected by ChubbyChecker within minutes) and the subsequent investigations. The accounts system can be interfaced in a READ-ONLY fashion to your broader system. Or you may choose to convert all accounting to our system – which is quite possible and will be cheaper, and more secure, in all likelihood, than your present systems.

In addition you receive an economical and very security-conscious system, incorporating our ChubbyChecker Ultimate Cross-Checking package, which fills the security gap inherent in stand-alone distributed systems that employ Byzantine Fault Tolerance, as well as all the normal security measures such as client-side end-to-end encryption, together with the absence of risk of Man-In-The-Middle and Denial-Of-Service attacks (with our use of jvm-libp2p, bypassing, as it does, the normal Domain Name System – DNS). The distributed nature of the system is what allows the operation of private-networked Smart Contracts, incorporating unlimited volumes of data per contract (and overall), and also it is what allows the secure sharing of information, as necessary, to enable business/health operations to function efficiently.

But what is the magnitude of the risk against which we are protecting? According to an independent analyst organisation (Analysis) there were 25,949,000 personal records compromised in the healthcare sector in 2023 alone. “These are often called ’supply chain attacks.’ In fact, it is not just one customer that can be attacked, but essentially every customer that uses that vendor’s services. Thus, a single vulnerability can threaten many thousands of organizations, such as in the 2023 MOVEit attack where already over 2,600 companies in more than 30 countries admitted to being attacked, with more than 80 million individuals’ data being compromised. In fact, 98% of organizations have a relationship with a vendor that experienced a data breach within the last two years. In some studies, the number of data compromises due to supply chain attacks in 2023 jumped 78% over 2022.” Stuart Madnick – Harvard Business Review The problem is no longer a case of “if” but now a case of “when” will your systems be attacked.

There are many vectors by which attacks may be mounted. Our use of jvm-libp2p avoids some, however, still, the most common and “fruitful” means of attack involve targeting individuals using Social Engineering. As an example of Social Engineering, the attackers may use knowledge gained in any fashion about an employee’s vulnerabilities, contacting that employee and using this knowledge to obtain the employee’s cooperation in an attack or in the exfiltration of information from your database. It is very important to have multiple offline data backups in place in the case of an attack, which may also arrive in the form of Ransomware. The basic process involves the attackers accessing your data and re-encrypting the data to prevent your access, then demanding a Ransom for decrypting the data. If you have a good back-up system, and your data is strongly encrypted, this is simply not a problem. Note that the backups need to be kept offline and thus inaccessible to an infiltrator online. Also consider the number of people who send passwords via email to themselves as a record, or to others to access their account in an “emergency”. If these emails are compromised in external third-party attacks outside your system, your system may become compromised by a malicious agent. This touches on the concept of an Attack Surface, meaning the myriad vulnerabilities any system may have.

Thus, there is a multitude of possible attack vectors threatening your system. Sealing it with the use of jvm-libp2p goes a long way towards total security. But there are many other practices that should be used to defend against Hacking and System Penetration. We can only offer advice to be vigilant and aware of the size of the threat, and to take appropriate counter measures (and there are many measures to take). As noted elsewhere our use of client side encryption will assist, as will the frequent, programmed running of our ChubbyChecker. Insider jobs via Social Engineering techniques and third-party breaches are still high on the list of threats. Education of all staff can help here, as can monitoring of database access patterns, and vigilance (automated) against abnormal patterns of use. Also, the use of Artificial Intelligence in this monitoring can make a difference when it comes to detection of “insider jobs”. An AI system can be trained to recognise excursions from normal usage patterns, and its performance is actually enhanced over time as it gains “experience”.